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The dialogue  that advocates  of liberalization  have with poli-
cymakers  would  improve  if more were made of the structural
factors that influence the effect of reducing distortions on
growth.
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Maroeoonomic  Adjustment
and  Growth
Easterly analyzes the structural relationship  tax on one form of capital. The tax revenue is
between policies that distort resource allocation  used to finance the acquisition of producdve
and long-term growth.  government capital.  There is then a tradeoff
He reviews briefly the Solow model in  between two forms of distortion - one resulting
which steady-state growth depends only on ex-  from distortionary taxadon and the other frQm
ogenous technological change.  Policy distor-  insufficient public capital.
tions do affect the rate of growth in the transition  Increasing the tax from zero has a positive
to the steady state in the Solow model.  But  effect on growth, but with further tax increases
growth falls off so rapidly in the Solow transi-  the relationship will eventually tum negative.
tion as to make it unsatisfactory as a model of  Tax revenue ("size of government") as a func-
long-term growth, even over periods as short as  tion of the tax rate will be given by a Laffer
a decade.  curve.  Growth still remains above a certain
Easterly proposes an increasing-returns  minimum as the tax rate gets arbitrarily large.
model in the spirit of the new literature on  The relationship between tax revenue and
economic growth.  With increasing retums,  growth for altemative tax rates can be positive,
endogenous economic variables - and thus  negative, or zero.  The same is true of the rela-
policy - will affect the steady-state rate of  tionship between public and private inm-estmnent.
growth.  Changes in the share of tax revenue dc\ oted to
Easterly's model gives output as a linear  capital accumulation ("government saving") will
function of total capital, but a decreasing func-  affect the results.
tion of each of two types of capital. The distor-  The results suggest that simple linear
tion is defined as a policy intervention that  relationships between distortions and growth, or
incre.ases  the cost of using one of the types of  between size of government and growth, are
capita.  The relationship between this distortion  untenable.  The dialogue between advocates of
and steady-state growth is negative but highly  liberalization and policymakers could be en-
nonlinear. At very low and very high levels of  riched by recognizing the structural factors that
distortion, the effect on growth of changing the  influence the effect of lowering distortions on
distonion is close to zero.  growth.
Changes in structural parameters of the  Easterly's model shows that reducing the
economy  the elasticity of substitution be-  distortions does not have an equal effect on
tween the two types of capital and the share of  growth in all circumstances. The effect depends
nondistorted capital in production - will  on how flexible the economy is (the elasticity of
significantly affect the impact of the policy  substitution), how large the share of the factor
distortion on growth.  being penalized in production is, and how high
Easterly extends the model to an analysis of  the distortions are initially.  Small changes in
the relationship between the size of government  either very low or very high levels of initial
and growth by treating the distortion strictly as a  distonions have a minimal effect on growth.
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I.  Introduction
Recent  experience  in  developing  countries  has  generated  new interest
in  the  theory  of long-run  economic  growth.  The  decade  of the  1980's  has  been  a
"lost  decade'  for  many  developing  countries  as a  combination  of  policy
mistakes  and  external  shocks  have  led  to  a slowdown  of economic  growth. As
Table  1 shows,  this  slowdown  has  been  widespread  across  regions  and  income
levels,  with the  sole  exception  of  Asian  countries. It  has  been  particularly
pronournced  in the  highly  indebted  countries  and  in  sub-Saharan  Africa. In
view  of tht  critical  need  to restart  growth  in those  countries,  the  theory  of
the  determinants  of economic  growth  has  recently  attracted  considerable
attention.
1.  The  Solow  model  and  long-run  growth
This  renewed  attention  comez  after  a long  hiatus. The  theory  of
economic  growth  has  been  guided  for  many  years  by the  seminal  model  of Solow
(1956). Solow's  work  was done  partially  in response  to the  Harrod-Domar  model
of the  1930's,  which  exhibited  unstable  dynamics  because  of a linear  capital-
output  ratio  and  the  response  of investment  to  output  changes. Solow  pointed
out  that  output  growth  could  be a stable  process  when the  production  function
allows  the  smooth  substitution  of labor  for  capital.  He also  pointed  out
something  that  was a  nagging  embarrassment  to the  field. If  we assume
constant  returns  to scale  and  exogenous  labor  (population)  growth,  then
capital  accumulation  cannot  be a source  of long-run  growth. If capital  grows
faster  than  labor,  then  diminishing  returns  will set  in and  growth  will  not  be
sustainable.  Since  capital  accumulation  is the  variable  in the  Solow  model
that  rtflects  all  changes  in the  economic  environment,  this  suggests  that
nothing  endogenous  can  determine  long-run  growth. For  example,  both  the  levelTable i:  Average annual growth rate of GDP in developing  countries (percent)
Country Group  1965-80  1980-87
Low income  economies  5.4  6.1
China and India  5.3  8.5
Other  5.5  1.7
Middle-income economies  6.2  2.8
Lower  middle-income  5.7  2.1
Upper middle-income  6.7  3.4
High-income economies  3.7  2.6
OECD countries  3.6  2.7
Others 11  8.1  -2.6
Regional Aggregates (low  and  middle income)
East Asia  7.2  8.0
Europe, H. East & N. Africa  6.2  NA
Latin America & Caribbean  6.0  1.4
South  Asia  3.8  4.8
Sub-Saharan  Africa  5.1  0.4
Memorandum items:
Seventeen  highly indebted  6.1  1.1
Highest growth rate 2/  15.2  13.0
Lowest growth rate  2/  0.1  -6.1
Source:  World Bank (1989).
Note:  Averages are weighted.
1/  Countries classified  by UN or otherwise regarded by their authorities  as
developing.
2/  For an individual country.3
of saving  and  distortions  of resource  allocation  will  affect  only  the level  of
output,  not  the  long-run  rate  of  growth. Thus,  Solow  identified  exogenous
technological  change  as the  engine  of  per  capita  income  growth.
The Solow  model  had  clear  implications  for  growth  of  developing
countries. It  predicted  that  productivity  of capital  would  be  higher  and  per
capita  income  would  grow  faster  in  capital-poor  countries  in  the  transition  to
the  long  run (assuming  labor  quality  is  the  same  in rich  and  poor  countries).
Lending  to  developing  countries  would  thus  have  a  high  rate  of return,  and
income  levels  of  all  countries  would  tend  to  converge  over  time. While
empirical  results  on  convergence  are  mixed,  it  is  zlear  that  at  best  it  has
been  disappointingly  slow  in  coming. 1 Table  2 shows  per  capita  income  growth
by region  and income  level  for  the  past  two  decades. The  countries  growing
the  slowest  are low-income  countries  (excluding  China  and India),  which  is  due
in  part  to  the  abysmal  growth  performance  of  sub-Saharan  Africa.  The fastest
growth  is  in  middle  income  East  Asia,  and  in  high-income  developing  countries
(largely  oil  exporters). OECD  countries  grew  at roughly  the  same  rate  as
lower  middle-income  developing  countries,  while  upper  middle-income  countries
grew  slightly  faster.
These  differences  no doubt  partly  reflect  different  levels  of
investment,  saving,  and  policy  distortions  across  countries,  since  these  do
have  an  effect  in  the  transition  to the  steady  state  in  the  Solow  model.
Table  2 shows,  for  example,  the  low  level  of investment  and  saving  in  sub-
Saharan  Africa  as compared  to  the  high  levels  in  East  Asia.  Corden  (1971)
showed  how trade  policy  can  affect  growth  in  the  transition  to  the  steady
state  in  the  Solow  model. Much  empirical  work  has  indeed  shown  growth  to  be
negatively  affected  by trade  policy  distortions,  financial  sector  distortions,
I.See  Romer  (1986),  Baumol  (1986),  Barro  (1989b)  and  Barro  and  Sala-i-Martin
(1989)4
Table 2: Growth, Investment  and Saving
Average  2 Share of GDP
Per Capita  1987
Income  Growth  Gross Domestic  Grows Domestic
1965-87  Investment  Saving
Low income  3.1  28  26
China and India  3.9  31  31
Other  1.5  19  15
Middle income  2.5  23  25
Lower  2.2  21  21
Upper  2.9  *25  27
High income  2.3  21  21
OECD  2.3  21  21
Other 1/  3.5  25  24
Low and middle income by region
Sub-Saharan  Africa  0.6  16  13
East Asia  5.1  30  35
South Asia  1.8  22  19
Europe,  Middle East,
North  Africa  2.5  n.a.  n.a.
Latin America & Caribbean  2.1  18  20
Low and middle income
Maximum  8.9
Minimum  -2.7
Source: World Bank (1989)
1/  Countries classified  by UN or otherwise regarded  by their authorities  as
developing.5
macroeconomic  instability,  and  current  government  spending,  among  other  policy
variables.2
However,  much  of  the  empirical.  work  on  growth  and  endogenous  economic
variables  dees  not  directly  use  the  Solow  model  or  any  other  theoretical
framework.  Much  of it  is  open  to  question  as to  direction  of  causality  --
perhaps  growth  leads  to good  policies  rather  than  the  other  way around. In
the  absence  of good  measures  of  many  policy  distortions  and  without  knowledge
of  the  underlying  functional  relationship  between  th-.e  distortions  and
growth,  the impact  of any  particular  policy  change  on growth  is  still  in
doubt.
2.  From  the  Solow  transition  to  the  new  growth  literature
While  the  Solow  model  can  provide  a framework  to relate  policy
variables  to  growth  in  the  transition  to  the  steady  state.  this  is  not  very
satisfactory.  For  any  plausible  value  of the  share  of  capital  in  output,  the
per  capita  growth  rate  declines  rapidly  with  capital  accumulation  because  of
diminishing  returns. However,  as  we already  saw,  long-run  per  capita  growth
in  the  Solow  model  depends  only  on  exogenous  technological  change.
Table  3 shows  a simulation  of  a Solow-type  CES  model  with  constant
returns  to  scale,  with  alternative  parameters  for  the  share  of  capital  and  the
elasticity  of substitution  (e.s.). 3 Beginning  from  arbitrary  initial  stocks
2.A  survey  of the  empirical  literature  and  some  further  empirical  testing  is
provided  in  Easterly  and  Wetzel  (1989). Another  general  empirical
discussion  is  contained  in  Chenery  et  al. (1986).
3.Strictly  speaking,  the 'capital  sharem  parameter  referred  to is  the
coefficient  on  capital  in  the  CES function,  which  is  only  equivalent  to  the
share  of  capital  in  output  in  the  Cobb-Douglas  case  where  e.s.-l.6
TABLE  3: Per  capita  growth  rate  during  transition  to  steady  state  from  Solow  model
Capital  share-0.6  at  e.s.-1  Capital  sharea0.4  at  e.s.-l
Elasticity  of  substitution:  Elasticity  of  substitution:
Year  0.5  1.0  2.5  5.0  0.5  1.0  2.5  5.0
1  7.5X  7.3X  7.2X  7.2X  4.8X  4.7X  4.8X  4.8X
2  6.7X  6.87  6.9X  6.9X  4.0X  4.3X  4.4X  4.5X
3  5.9X  6.32  6.62  6.7S  3.42  3.82  4.22  4.32
4  5.22  5.92  6.32  6.52  2.82  3.52  3.92  4.12
5  4.6X  5.5X  6.1X  6.3X  2.42  3.22  3.7X  3.9X
6  4.1X  5.22  5.92  6.12  2.12  2.92  3.52  3.72
7  3.62  4.92  5.72  6.02  1.8X  2?7%  3.32  3.62
8  3.22  4.62  5.52  5.82  1.62  2.52  3.22  3.42
9  2.92  4.42  5.32  5.72  1.42  2.32  3.02  3.32
10  2.6%  4.12  5.22  5.52  1.22  2.12  2.92  3.22
20  0.92  2.52  4.12  4.6X  0.42  1.12  1.92  2.32
30  0.42  1.62  3.42  4.12  0.22  0.62  1.42  1.72
40  0.2%  1.12  3.02  3.82  0.12  0.42  1.02  1.42
50  0.12  0.82  2.62  3.6X  0.02  0.22  0.82  l.iX
100  0.02  0.22  1.82  3.12  0.02  0.02  0.22  0.52
infinite  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.02
Note:  Investment  ratio-.20  for  all  simulations7
of  capital  and  labor,  per  capita  growth  will  initially  take  place  as the
capital/labor  ratio  is increased  towards  its  steady  state  value  (which  is  zero
in  this  simulation  since  there  is  no technological  chanee). We  begin  with  the
year  in  which  the  growth  rate  is  roughly  the  same  for  any  elasticity  of
substitution.  Growth  will  be  higher  with  a  higher  share  of  capital  for  fixed
initial  stocks  of  capital  and  labor  because  the  marginal  product  of  capital
will  be  higher.
For  all  the  various  parameter  combinations,  there  is  a significant
fall-off  in  per  capita  growth  over  periods  as short  as  a decade. The  relative
decline  in  growth  is  more  severe  the  lower  is  ths  share  of  capital  and  the
lower  is the  elasticity  of  substitution.  In  the  worst  case  in  the  table
(capital  share-.4  and  e.s.-O.5),  per  capita  growth  after  a  decade  is  only  a
quarter  of  growth  in  the  first  year. But  even  in  the  beat  possible  case  of
extremely  high  e.s.(-5)  and  capital  share  (-.6).  per  capita  growth  still  falls
from  7.2  percent  to  5.5  percent  over  a decade. There  is  little  evidence  of
such  rapid  deceleration  in  growth  in  practice,  which  makes  the  Solow
transition  unappealing  as  a model  of  supply-side  growth. 4
Recent  works in  the  theoretical  literature  have  addressed  this
problem  by  dropping  one  of  the  key  assumptions  to  the  Solow  model  --  constant
returns  to scale. Such  authors  as  Lucas  (1987),  Romer  (1986,  1987,  1988,
1989a,  1989b),  Obstfeld  (1989)  and  Barro  (1989a,  1989b)  postulate  increasing
returns  that  arise  either  from  technological  externalities  from  investment  in
physical  capital  or spillovers  from  accumulation  of  human  capital. With
increasing  returns,  per  capita  growth  is  possible  in  the  long  run  based  on
capital  accumulation  alone. The  door  is  opened  again  for  endogenous  economic
variables,  and  thus  policy,  to  affect  the  rate  of long-run  growth.
4.In  principle,  this  deceleration  could  be countered  by  technical  progress  and
increased  labor  quality,  but  there  is  no reason  to  assume  these  will  offset
the  deceleration  unless  we make  them  endogenous.8
II.  An inereasina  returns  model  of distortions  and  growth
The  model  in  this  paper  is  intended  as  an illustration  of the  kind  of
effects  policy  distortions  can  have  on growth  in  an increasing  returns
economy. It  postulates  a simple  form  of increasing  returns  that  results  in  a
linear  relationship  between  output  and  capital. It then  considers  the  effect
of  a distortion  that  causes  the  marginal  products  of different  types  of
capital  to diverge. The  relationship  between  the  distortion  and  the  rate  of
growth  is  highly  nonlinear,  which  suggests  a  certain  caution  about  simplistic
assumptions  about  the  effect  of  distortions  on  growth.
1.  The  model
Equation  (1)  shows  the  production  function  that  will provide  the
basis  for  our  analysis.
(1)  A  I(1  - 7pi  K,  + 7pK 2 LP
Output  is  a function  of the  stock  of technological  knowledge  A, two
types  of capital  K1 and  K2, and  labor  L.  The  functional  form  chosen  is  a CES
function  of the  two  types  of capital  nested  within  a  Cobb-Douglas  function  for
total  capital  and  labor. The  function  exhib4"s  constant  returns  to scale  in
the  three  inputs.  The  main focus  of the  analysis  will  be on substitution
between  the  two  types  of capital  and  so the  more general  CES  form  is  chosen
with elasticity  of substitution  l/(pl-l).
The  distortion  that  will  be considered  is  one  that  causes  the
marginal  products  of the  two  forms  of capital  to  diverge:9
OK  1
(2)  -ml  ,et
OK2
This  specification  covers  any  type  of distortion  that  induces  extra
costs  to the  users  of  type  1  capital. 5 The  most  obvious  is  a tax  by the
government  on the  use  of type  1 capital,  with  type  2  capital  exempt. The
distinction  between  the  two  capital  types  could  reflect  ownership,  location,
or other  characteristics:  rural  versus  urban  capital,  human  versus  physical
capital,  formal  versus  informal  sector,  corporate  versus  household  capital,
imported  versus  domestically  produced  capital  goods,  or foreign-owned  versus
domestically-owned  capital. Besides  taxes,  other  forms  of distortion  could
include  credit  subsidies  or  quantitative  credit  allocation  to particular
capital  types,  or tariffs  or  QR's  on imported  capital  goods. It  could  even
include  macroeconomic  instability  that  induces  noise  in relative  prices  of
capital  goods.
Defining  ip  as the  sum  of the  two  forms  of  capital,  we can  solve  for
their  relationship  to  Kp from (2). The  distortion  t induces  more  of type  2
capital  to  be held  relative  to type  1  capital  than  is socially  optimal:
1-
r7  1 pI  1-p 1
(3)  K  -2  e  KR
il_pl  i-tp 1 +  e~~
5.We  assume  the  same  user  cost  for  the  two  types  of capital  excluding  the
distortion.10
K
(4)  K  K  t
1  1
1-  1-P
The  specification  of  the  technological  knowledge  parameter  A as
endogenous  is  what  will  make the  economy  exhibit  increasing  returns.
Following  Romer  (1986),  we simply  specify  technological  knowledge  as  a
function  of the  stocks  of capital  and  labor:
(5)  A -aK'  LC
p
In the  long  run,  the  stock  of  knowledge  will  be positively  related  to
the  stock  of capital. This  is  because  of learning  that  takes  place  in the
process  of creating  physical  or  human  capital,  including  the  unintended
spillovers  to  knowledge  in  other  areas  outside  the  one  receiving  the
investment.  More  generally,  innovation  and  investment  respond  to
fundamentally  the  same  incentives,  so that  in the  long  run  an increase  in
capital  will  be associated  with  an increase  in the  stock  of  knowledge.
Of course,  in the  short  run  changes  in  capital  are  not  necessarily
matched  by changes  in  knowledge  --  a  war that  wipes  out  half  a  nation's
physical  capital  leaves  its  stock  of knowledge  untouched.  Also,  the  stock  of
knowledge  will  be influenced  by investment  in  other  countries,  so there  will
be externalities  across  nationa'  borders. This  last  fact  is  not addressed  by
our  model,  but  it is  probably  not  as serious  as it  first  appears,  since  much
of the  relevant  knowledge  is  at the  very  specific  level  needed  to implement
technical  advances  in  local  circumstances.11
The  relationship  between  labor  and  the  stock  of  knowledge  is less
clear. On one  hand,  there  is  the  argument  that  the  larger  the  population  the
more  likely  it is  to produce  an  Einstein  who  will  make  a  huge  contribution  to
knowledge. On the  other  side,  some  have  argued  that  abundant  labor  (relative
to land  or  capital)  acts  as  a disincentive  to  innovation  --  "necessity  is the
mother  of invention."  The  relative  scarcity  of labor  in the  19th  century
U.S.,  for  example,  has  been  cited  by some  economic  historians  as the  key
factor  explaining  the  huge  amount  of labor-substituting  innovation  that  took
place. 6 So C in  equation  (3)  could  be positive  or  negative.
Substituting  from  (3),  (4)  and  (5)  into  (1),  we get  the  following
expression  for  output  as  a function  of aggregate  capital  and  labor:
(6)  Q  ' U9K  "  LP  (
where  9  is  given  by:
t
[i  1  ei  1P
(7)  =  (1-  7  1  I+  1  t
p  i-p  ￿1t I  1
1 *P 3 1p
1 +  ip  e  1 +  e
To analyze  the  steady  state,  it is  convenient  to study  cases  where
output  is linearly  related  to  capital,  as in  traditional  development  models
and  the  models  of  Romer  (1986)  and  Barro  (1989a).  For  that  we would  assume
6.Habakkuk  (1962).12
X  p. For  the  role  of labor  in the  steady  state,  we consider  three  special
'ases  that  lead  to similar  analytical  forms,  although  they  have  different
interpretations.  The  most  obvious  is  one  where  population  is  stationary  in
the  steady  state,  so  that  we can  normalize  L-1  and  it  will  drop  out  of (6).
Secondly,  we could  assume  C is  equal  to l-p,  implying  that  output  is  a linear
function  of labor,  or that  per  capita  income  is  a function  of the  capital
stock.
Finally,  C could  be equal  to -p,  implying  that  that  technical
knowledge  is  negatively  related  to  labor  and  that  total  output  is  not  a
function  of labor  in  the  steady  state. Capital  is  defined  to include  human
capital,  so labor  skills  continue  to  have  an  effect  on  production.  Such  a
relation  would  only  hold in  the  long  run  --  a relative  decrease  in  labor
creates  an incentive  to  accumulation  of technical  knowledge  that  exactly
offsets  the  decline  in  physical  labor. In  the  short  run,  increases  in labor
still  increase  output.
Assuming  that  X  - p and  that  labor  is  constant  in  steady  state  (or
=  -p),  we get  the  following  expression  for  gross  output:
(8)  Q-a@K
It follows  that  growth  in  output  will  be given  by the  following:
(9)  g  - ati  - a
where  i  is the  ratio  of  gross  investment  to output  and  6 is  the  rate  of
depreciation  on capital. Growth  is  a function  of the  rate  of gross13
investment,  and  the  productivity  of capital  a#. Capital  productivity  reflects
the  effects  of the  distortion  t, as  shown  in (7).
In the  steady  state  in  the  open  economy,  investment  will  be equal  to
the  saving  rate  plus  some  sustainable  amount  of foreign  borrowing.  We define
sustainability  as the  requirement  that  the  ratio  of foreign  debt  to  the
capital  stock  be constant  in the  long  run. Then  investment  will be  given  by
the  following  in  steady  state:
(r-g)  £p
(10)  ip  sp  - a
where  r is  the real  interest  rate  paid  on foreign  debt  and  p is  the  ratio  of
debt  to the  capital  stock. Substituting  from  (10)  into  (9),  we can  get  a
reduced  form  for  the  growth  rate  as follows:
(11)  g8  1-  (a[sp  - r  )
Growth  will be  given  by the  total  productivity  of saving,  as  measured
by the  saving  rate  times  the  productivity  of  capital,  less  interest  on  debt
and  depreciation,  times  the  multiplier  l/(l-xp)  that  reflects  the  leveraging
of saving  into  capital  accumulation.
We can  then  substitute  (11)  back  into  (10)  to get  the  steady  state
rate  of investment:
sp-  (r +  6) F/.ll
(12)  ip - 1-=P
p~~~~14
2. Simulations  of distortion  and  steady-state  growth
We can simulate  equation  (11)  to show  the  relationship  between  growth
and distortion  for  plausible  parameter  values. 7 Figure  1 shows  the  steady
state  growth  rate  that  corresponds  to different  values  of t.  It is clear  that
the  relationship  is  highly  nonlinear. As t increases  from  zero,  the  effect  on
growth  is slight  at first.  Successive  increases  in t,  however,  cause  larger
and larger  decreases  in growth,  as shown  in  the second  panel  of figure  1.
However,  at some  point  the  effect  on  growth  from  successive  distortion
increases  again  diminishes.  As t gets  very  large,  the  growth  rate
asymptotically  approaches  a  minimum.
The  nonlinear  behavior  of the  model  reflects  two fundamental  economic
phenomena. The  first  is  the  phenomenon  of diminishing  returns. Although
increases  in  total  capital  lead  to  proportional  increases  in  output,  increases
in  one form  of  capital  alone  will lead  to successively  smaller  increases  in
output. As higher  and  higher  distortions  induce  capital  to shift  from  type  1
to  type  2,  more output  and  growth  is sacrificed  as diminishing  returns  set  in
on the  use of type  2 capital.  However,  as the  distortion  increases  the  use of
type  1  capital  approaches  zero. As it gets  close  to zero,  the  damage  caused
by additional  increases  in  distortion  become  slight. Intuitively,  there  is
not  much  difference  between  the  effect  of  a 500Z  tax  and a 6002  tax  --  both
lead  to  the  disappearance  of  the factor  being  taxed. Thus,  growth  reaches  an
absolute  minimum (about  5Z in  figure  1)  no  matter  how high  the  distortion.
A real  world  example  of this  phenomenon  might  be the informal  sector
as dramatized  recently  by de  Soto (1987). A  high  level  of state  zegulation  of
7.For  the  base  case,  we specify  a  - .798,  p - .4,  6  - .05,  P1 - .6  (elasticity
of substitution  - -2.5),  7p - 0.5,  r - 0.1,  and  sp  - .28.mollocAlso  go  gswAIUo 
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the  formal  sector  simply  causes  capital  to be transferrred  to the  informal
sector. Growth  continues  at a  certain  level  outside  the  control  of the  state,
although  it is lower  than  it  would  be if the  formal  sector  were  also
unregulated,  since  the  two  types  of capital  are  not  perfect  substitutes.
3.  Sensitivity  to structural  parameters
It is  clear  from  the  expression  for  O  in (7)  that  the  critical
parameter  is the  substitution  parameter  Pl.  To see  the  effect  of this
parameter  on  behavior  of  the  model,  we consider  alternative  values  of the
elasticity  of substitution  (with  absolute  value  equal  to  l1(l-pl)).  Figure  2
shows  distortion-growth  relationship  for  2 extreme  values  of the  elasticity  of
substitution  --  0.5  and  5.0  in  absolute  value. At low  levels  of distortion,
the  growth  rate  is  higher  with the  lower  elasticity.  With  inelastic
substitution  between  types  of  capital,  resource  allocation  is  not  changed  as
much  by a given  distortion  and  the  loss  of output  is  not  as great.
However.  as the  distortion  increases,  growth  reaches  a  minimum  with
the  higher  elasticity,  but  continues  to  decline  with the  inelastic  production
function. It  can  be shown  from (7)  that  O  goes  to  zero  if  the  elasticity  of
substitution  is less  than  or equal  to  one,  while  it  has  a  nonzero  limit  if  the
elasticity  is  greater  than  one. 8 Intuitively,  if  the  substitution  of type  2
for  type  1 capital  is  not  strong  enough  to  offset  the  effect  of the
distortion,  then  output  goes  to zero  as t increases.  To put  it  another  way,
8.If  the  elasticity  of substitution  is less  than  one  in  absolute  value,  then
P1 is  negative. Thus,  the  first  term  in (7)  explodes  as t goes  to infinity.
Since  the  exponent  (l-p)/pl  is  also  negative,  0 goes  to  zero.  If  P1 >  0,
then  0 converges  to  7p  raised  to  the  power  of (l-p)/Pl.17
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type  2  capital  is  not  a good  substitute  for  type  1 capital.  As the  use  of type
1 capital  is driven  to zero  by an arbitrarily  large  distortion,  output  will
also  go to  zero.
The  results  of the  model  suggest  that  we must  carefully  evaluate  the
structure  of the  economy  and  the  initial  level  of distortion  in  order  to
predict  the  long  run  effect  of zeducing  distortions.  In an  economy  with  a low
elasticity  of substitution,  reducing  a small  distortion  may  have little  effect
on  growth. As figure  2 showed,  the  growth-distortion  relationship  is  very
flat  for  low  distortion  levels  if  the  elasticity  of substitution  is small.
Conversely,  in an  economy  with  a high  elasticity  of substitution,  a small
reduction  in a  high rate  of distortion  also  may  not  have  much  effect. Such  an
economy  may  have  already  passed  the  rate  of distortion  at  which  the  growth
rate  reaches  a  minimum. The  true  payoff  to  distortion  reduction  comes  in  the
steep  part  of the  curves  in figure  2,  which  comes  at lower  rates  of  distortion
in  the  high-substitution  economy.
An example  where  the  elasticity  of substitution  would  be important  in
practice  can  be given  by treating  K1 as imported  capital  goods  and  K2 as
domestically  produced  capital  goods. The  distortion  t  would  be an import
tariff  or quota  that  raises  the  user  cost  of  Kl.  If the  structure  of the
economy  (resource  endowments,  size  of the  economy,  etc.)  is such  as to foster
an  efficient  domestic  capital  goods  industry,  then  K1 and  K2  would  be close
substitutes.  In this  case.  even  low  levels  of the  tariff  or quota  premium  t
would  distort  resource  allocation  and  lower  growth  significantly.  However,  as
t is  increased,  the  use  of imported  capital  goods  would  approach  zero  and
further  changes  in  t  would  not  make  much  difference  to the  rate  of growth.
On the  other  hand,  an economy  in  which  structural  characteristics
restrict  the  scope  of the  domestic  capital  goods  industry  would  have  a low19
elasticity  of substitution  between  K1 and  K2. In  this  economy,  small  changes
to low  import  tariffs  or  quota  premia  on  capital  goods  would  not  make  much
difference.  As import  restrictions  are  tightened  further  and  further,
however,  the  damage  to output  and  growth  is  practically  unlimited. The  use  of
imported  capital  goods  does  not  go  to zero  very  fast  as t increases  because
they  have  no close  substitute.
The  implications  of trade  liberalization  for  capital  goods  would  be
ver  different  in  these  two  types  of economies.  In the  high-substitution
economy,  small  reductions  in  tariffs  or  quotas  would  be  beneficial  from  low
initial  levels,  but  would  not  make  much  difference  if initial  tariffs  or  quota
premia  are  high.  In  the  low-substitution  economy,  trade  liberalization  from
low  distortion  levels  would  make little  difference,  but  would  be very
effective  if  initial  trade  distortions  were  high.
The  finding  that  there  is  a  maximum  loss  of growth  associated  with
distortion  also  has important  policy  implications.  If the  substitution
elasticity  is  high  enough,  the  loss  of growth  from  distortion  may  be small
enough  that  it can  be offset  by other  policy  measures. Table  4 shows  the
maximum  loss  of growth  associated  with  an  infinite  level  of distortion  for
different  elasticities  of substitution.  At elasticities  of substitution
higher  than  2.5,  the  drop  in  the  growth  rate  is  under  5  percentage  points.
The  obvious  variable  to  play  the  role  of  offsetting  influence  on
growth  in  our  model  is  saving.  Since  0 reaches  a nonzero  limit  as t  goes  to
infinity  with the  elasticity  of substitution  greater  than  one,  there  is a
finite  amount  of saving  that  can  offset  even  an infinitely  large  distortion  in
such  economies. Table  5 shows  the  saving  increase  that  would  be required.
With e  greater  than  2.5,  the  increase  in the  saving  rate  is less  than  nine
points  of GDP. While  this  represents  a  maqsive  loss  in  welfare,  it  does  show20
TABLE  4:
Maximum  decline  in  growth  rate  from
infinitely  large  distortion--
alternative  elasticities  of substitution
--------- i--------------------------------------------------
Elasticity  Maximum  decline
















that  even  the  most  highly  distorted  economy  can  grow  rapidly  if saving  is  high
enough.  This  may  help  to explain  why  an economy  such  as  China  known  to be
characterized  by  high state  intervention  and  distortion  could  still  grow
respectably  with a  high  saving  rate. 9
The  other  important  structural  parameter  in  the  production  function
is  the  coefficient  7p.  This  measures  the  technological  importance  of K2 in
the  production  function. If the  elasticity  of substitution  is  equal  to unity
(Cobb-Douglas),  then  7p is  the  value  share  of  K2 in total  capital. With  an
elasticity  of substitution  different  from  unity,  the  share  of  K2 will  not  be
constant  but  will  still  be positively  affected  by 7p.
Figure  3 shows  the  effect  of changing  7p on the  growth-distortion
relationship.  A larger  7D  means  that  the  type  of capital  favored  by the
distortion  t is  more  important  in  total  production,  while  the  type  of capital
being  penalized  is  less  important.  This  will imply  that  a given  distortion  is
much less  damaging  to growth,  as shown  in figure  3.
A real  world  example  of the  effect  of  7p can  be given  by once  again
treating  K1 as formal  sector  capital  and  K2 as informal  capital. If 7p is
high,  then  informal  sector  capital  has  a large  weight  in the  production
function,  while  the  modern  sector  has  a small  weight. The  effect  of
distortions  imposed  on the  modern  sector  would  be  modest  in such  a  case.
How  7p  differs  across  countries  is  not  very  clear. Even  in  countries
that  appear  to  have  a large  share  of  production  accounted  for  by informal
capital,  it is  difficult  to distinguish  whether  this  is  due  to  the  relative
9.This  contrasts  to the  explanation  of  Lucas  (1988)  who  argued  that  the  fact
that  centrally  planned  economies  have respectable  growth  rates  confirms  that
distortions  only  have level  effects  rather  than  growth  effects.22
TABLE  5: Required  increase  in  saving  to  offset
decrease  in  growth  due  to  infinite  distortion
Elasticity  of  Required  increase
substitution  in  saving
(ratio  to  GDP)















------------------------------  -----------------------------EFFECT  ON  GROWTH  OF  SHARE  OF  ~r^vUI  --
LE VEF  DSTORTION 
LEVELS  (*  sst1c1t  y  of  subst1tutn 
)
GROWTH
*  . oS  f






A  GAMMA  P=.4
°3  GAMMA p-.624
size  of  K1 and  K2 or to the  technological  parameter  7p.  The  former  is an
endogenous  response  to  distortion,  while  che  latter  is  exogenous. However,  a
larger  share  of informal  capital  in  one  country  with the  same  distortion  level
as  another  would  imply  a larger  7p  in  the  first  country,  which  may  be due  to
cultural  and  historical  factors  or the  overall  level  of development.
II.  Distortionary  taxes,  size  of government,  and  growth
The  variable  c  has  been  treated  so far  as  a generic  distortion  that
simpl;  causes  marginal  products  of capital  to  diverge. We can  extend  the
model  to  the  analysis  of fiscal  behavior  by treating  t  strictly  as a tax  on
one  form  of capital. We  will  also  treat  this  tax  as the  only  form  of tax
revenue  for  the  government.  Whiie  an  exaggeration,  this  is  not  unlike  the
situation  in  many  developing  countr 4.es  where  taxes  are  highly  distortionary
and  large  segments  of the  economy  escape  taxation  altogether.  A common
situation  is that  the  capital  in the  rural/subsistence/traditional  sector
largely  escapes  taxation,  while  the  modern  sector  or export  sector  is  heavily
taxed.
Although  the  state  lowers  growth  by imposing  d'stortionary  taxes,  it
can  also  contribute  to  growth  by providing  essential  public  goods  such  as
roads,  sanitation  services,  etc. Lack  of such  public  goods  in the  absence  of
the  state  is  itself  a distortion.  Since  these  are  financed  by taxes,  we have  a
tradeoff  between  two  types  of distortions  --  one  caused  by insufficient  public
goods  and  one  caused  by distortionary  taxes.
1.  The  Model
We  modify  the  production  function  from  (1)  to include  a public
capital  stock:25
P2  b
(13)  Q  - A  [7K  +  72K2  +  7GKG J
Total  capital  K  will  be the  aggregate  of the  two  types  of  private  capital  (Kl
and  K2)  and  public  capital  KG.  The  form  of the  production  function  is  a CES
function  of the  two  types  of  private  capital  nested  within  a  CES function  of
public  and  private  capital,  which  is  in turn  nested  within  a  Cobb-Douglas
function  for  capital  and  labor. Thus,  P1 is  the  substitution  parameter
between  the  2  types  of private  capital,  while  P2 is  the  substitution  parameter
between  public  and  private  capital. We  make  the  same  assumptions  about  A as
before  except  relating  to  total  capital  K.  Equations  (3)  and (4)  continue  to
hold for  the  determination  of the  two  types  of  private  capital  as  a share  of
total  private  capital,  with  71 =  1-7p  and  72  - 7p.  Denoting  kp as the  share
of private  capital  in  the  total,  we can  substitute  from  (3),  (4),  and (5)  into
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Output  continues  to  be given  as a linear  function  of K  with  at  as the
output-capital  ratio. Thus  growth  can  be given  as  a function  of  public  and
private  investment  analogously  to (6)  above. We  will define  public  and
private  investment  equations  based  on  their  saving  behavior  and  sustainable
borrowing,  analogous  to (10)  above.
Tax  revenue  as a ratio  to output  will  be given  as the  linear  tax  rate
et-l  times  the  ratio  of K1 to  output. Substituting  from  (4)  for  K1, we get
the  following  expressions
(15)  TREV  Ce  -1)  1pi (66) Q  -#1  l
1+  [7 jPl  e  -p 1
The  accumulation  of government  capital  will then  be given  as the
saving  ratio  sG times  tax  revenue,  less  depreciation  and  interest  on debt,
plus  new sustainable  borrowing. The  latter  is  defined  as  keeping  the  ratio  of
government  debt  to  output  constant,  which  implies  new  borrowing  will be the
growth  rate  times  the  ratio  of debt  to output,  which  in turn  is  equal  to the
debt-capital  ratio  XG times  the  ratio  of the  government  capital  stock  to
output:
(G  TREV  (1-kv  - (1-kt 
(16)  -ins8  - Q  a  rg  -. 427
An analogous  expression  will  hold for  the  accumulation  of  private
capital  in steady  state,  except  that  private  income  is  defined  as total  output
less  the  tax  revenue  collected  by the  government:
Y-P  f~~TREV 1 kk (17)  II  - p  -l__)]  _  - (r-g)  2  z
Substituting  from  (15)  into  (16)  and (17),  and  in turn  from (16)  and (17)  into
the  expression  for  g,  we get  the  following  expression:
(18)  g-  (bG(lkp)  +atk  )[a  p - r (9 (1-k  + b  k  )  + 1-  G  1-k  )  +s(kl-kG  ) 
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The  right-hand  side  of (18)  still  contains  an endogenous  variable,  the  share
of  private  capital  in  total  capital,  kp.  To derive  the  steady  state  level  of
kp,  we need  another  equilibrium  condition. (18)  is  derived  from  the  condition
that  the  percentage  change  in  total  capital  be equal  to the  growth  rate.
However,  in  a steady  state  for  kp,  we also  have  the  condition  that  the
percentage  change  in private  capital  be equal  to  the  percentage  change  in
public  capital. Equivalently,  the  percentage  change  in  public  capital  must
also  be equal  to the  growth  rate. From (16),  this  gives  us the  following
expression  for  kps28
g +  5  +  (r-g)  PG
g + 6 + sG  -1  +  (r-g)  sG
l  1j-Pl  tJ
(18)  and (19)  together  determine  the steady  state  values  of kp and  g.
2.  Simulation  of growth  and  tax revenue
We again  use  the  method  of simulating  the  model for  plausible  values
of  the  parameters  to illustrate  the  properties  of the  model. 10 The first
relationship  of interest  is  that  between  the  tax rate  and tax  revenue,  shown
in figure  4.  We get  a standard  Laffer  curve  relationship.  As the  tax rate
increases  from  zero,  tax revenue  initially  rises  rapidly,  then  flattens  out  as
the  decline  in the  tax  base  offsets  the  increase  in the  rate.  If the
elasticity  of substitution  between  K1 and  K2 is  greater  than  one,  then  the
effect  of the  decline  in the  tax  base  will  eventually  outweigh  that  of the
rate  increase,  so that  revenue  declines  with rate  increases.
The relationship  between  the  growth  rate  and the  tax rate  is  more
complex  than in  the  model  without  government. As shown  in figure  5, the
growth  rate  initially  increases  with  a rise  in  the  tax rate. This is  because
tax  revenues  finance  the  accumulation  of public  capital,  whose  optimal  level
is  greater  than  zero.  However,  as  more  public  capital  is  accumulated
diminishing  returns  set  in,  while  at the  same  time  the  effect  of the
1O.The  parameters  for  the  base  case  are  a  - 1.05,  G0.4  .05,  SG - 0.25,
Sp_;  0.25,  71 - 72 - 7G - 1/3,  PI  - P2 - 0.5 (elasticity  of substitution
- -2),  r - 0.1,  sg  - sp  - .25.4
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distortion  to  private  capital  allocation  worsens  with successive  tax  rate
increases.  Thus,  at some  point  further  tax  rate  increases  will  lower  the  rate
of growth. From  that  point,  the  behavior  of the  growth-distortion  relation  is
similar  to  the  first  model. Further  increases  in  the  tax  rate  are
increasingly  costly  up to  the  point  in  which  K1 becomes  close  enough  to zero
that  further  rate  increases  do  not  make  much  difference.  After  that  growth
reaches  a  minimum  if  the  elasticity  of substitution  is sufficiently  large,
just  as in  the  model  without  government.  However,  the  cost  of an  arbitrarily
large  tax  rate  will  be larger  in the  model  with government,  because  in
addition  to  the  arbitrarily  large  distortion  the  stock  of  p'ablic  capital  will
approach  zero  as tax  revenue  goes  to  zero.
Putting  figures  4  and  5 together,  we can  see  the  relationship  between
tax  revenue  and  growth  that  will  be traced  out  by  varying  the  tax  rate  from
zero  to infinity.  At point  A in  figure  6, the  tax  rate  is  at zero. Both
growth  and  tax  revenue  increase  strongly  as the  tax  rate  rises,  since  the
additional  tax  revenue  is  used  to finance  the  acquisition  of productive  public
capital. Growth  reaches  a  maximum  at  B, at  which  point  the  positive
contribution  of  public  capital  to growth  just  offsets  the  negative  effect  of
the  tax  distortion.  From  B to  C, further  increases  in tax  rates  lead  to a
tradeoff  between  tax  revenue  and  growth  --  they  continue  to increase  revenue
(and  public  capital)  but  at the  expense  of  a distortion  severe  enough  to
reduce  growth. At C, tax  revenue  as  a ratio  to  output  reaches  its  maximum  as
in  the  Laffer  curve  of figure  4.  From  that  point  on,  tax  rate  increases  are
counterproductive  in  terms  of  both  revenue  and  growth  --  revenue  declines
because  we are  on the  "wrong"  side  of the  Laffer  curve,  and  growth  declines
because  of the  effect  of the  distortion.  At point  D,  we converge  to theFigure  6
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minimum  growth  rate  where  tax  revenue  and  the  use  of both  K1 and  KG  are
arbitrarily  close  to  zero.
Figure  6 suggests  caution  on  attempting  to  estimate  the  empirical
correlation  between  growth  and  the  size  of  government  (as  measured  either  by
revenue  or spending). If  we think  of  countries  with similar  structure  but
different  tax  rates  being  distributed  randomly  along  the  curve,  estimates  of
the  relationship  could  be  positive  or  negative. The  absolute  value  of  the
coefficient  on size  of  government  in  a growth  regression  could  range  from  zero
(at  point  B) to infinity  (at  point  C). Even  the  interpretation  of  the
coefficient  is  ambiguous.  A positive  relationship  is  implied  by both  of  the
segments  AB  and  CD,  but  for  much  different  reasons  --  the  former  because  tax
rate  hikes  increase  both  growth  and  revenue  and  the  latter  because  rate  hikes
decrease  both. Causation  is  also  problematic  since  both  tax  revenue  and
growth  are  endogenous.
To  try  to  pin  down  where  governments  might  wind  up  on figure  6 is  a
task  for  political  economy  theory. The  benevolent  growth-maximizing
governments  would  tend  to  cluster  around  B.  (As  Barro  (1989a)  points  out  in  a
similar  context,  if  we estimated  a regression  between  growth  and  size  of
government  from  such  a sample,  we  would  erroneously  conclude  there  was  no
relationship  between  the  two.) The  Buchanan-type  patronage-maximizing  state
would  move  more  towards  point  C (but  not  all  the  way if  it  also  values  future
patronage  which  will  increase  with  higher  growth). In  general,  a rational
state  valuing  some  mixture  of  patronage  and  growth  would  be in  the  segment  BC.
which  might  explain  the  negative  relationship  traditionally  found  in  empirical
work.  However,  there  are  examples  from  the  political  economy  literature  of
irrational  outcomes  from  game-theoretic  interactions  between  factions  or
coalitions,  which  could  result  in  governments  being  along  AB or  CD.11
ll.See  the  survey  in  Haggard  (1989). See  also  Findlay  (1989)  and  Srinivasan
(1989)  for  provocative  analyses  of  how  the  state  behaves.34
This  model  can  also  yield  insight  on the  relationship  between  public
and  private  investment.  Figure  7 shows  the  combinations  of public  and  private
investment  rates  associated  with different  levels  of the  tax  rate. This
diagram  should  give  us pause  about  the  possibility  of empirically  estimating
simple  cross-section  relationships  between  public  and  private  investment,  at
least  across  steady  states  with different  tax  rates.
Initial  increases  in the  tax  rate  (from  zero  at point  A) increase
growth  sharply,  which  raises  the  financeable  level  of private  investment
(because  the  private  sector  can  borrow  more). However,  the  increase  in tax
revenue  decreases  private  saving,  lowering  the  financeable  level  of private
investment.  The  two  effects  roughly  offset  each  other  for  the  initial
increases  in the  tax  rate (the  positive  effect  even  dominates  at first).
After  that,  however, "crowding  out"  of  private  investment  by public
investment  takes  place  due  to the  redistribution  of income  from  the  private  to
the  public  sector  with  higher  taxes. Growth  could  still  be increasing  over
part  of this  range,  however,  if  public  investment  is  below  the  optimal  level.
At point  B, tax  revenue  is  maximized. Further  tax  rate  increases  lower
revenue,  so income  is redistributed  back  towards  the  private  sector,  raising
private  and  lowering  public  investment.  At some  point  the  effect  of the
distortion  on growth  becomes  so severe,  however,  as to  lower  the  financeable
level  of  private  investment  again.
3.  Tax  reform  and  arowth
So far  we have  taken  as  given  that  taxes  are  distortionary,  since
only  one  type  of  capital  can  be taxed. What  if in  fact  a tax  reform  can  be
initiated  that  taxes  both  forms  of  capital  equally? This  makes  it  possible  to
finance  the  accumulation  of  public  capital  without  distorting  the  allocationFigure  7
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private  capital  between  the  two  types. Tax  revenue  will  be given  as a
function  of  private  capital  instead  of type  1 capital  alone. More tax  revenue
will  be generated  at each  tax  rate,  while  the  tax  rate  itself  does  not
directly  affect  growth.
A tax  on  all  private  capital  makes  it  possible  to  generate  a  higher
growth  rate,  since  the  tax  will  not  distort  private  capital  allocation  and
lead  to  efficiency  losses. However,  the  difference  is  not  dramatic--in  the
base  case  simulation  described  above,  the  maximum  growth  rate  with  a tax  on
one  form  of capital  is  8.06?,  while  with a  tax  on  all  private  capital  maximum
growth  is  8.532. Thus,  reform  of the  tax  system  to  tax  all  capital  would  lead
to an improvement  of roughly  half  a percentage  point  in  the  long  run  growth
rate.
The  effect  of tax  reform  on growth  is  not large  because  we are
comparing  optimal  policies  in  the  two  cases. With  optimal  policies,  the  tax
rates  will  not  be large--the  optimal  exponential  rate  is 362  with  differential
taxation  and  252  in  the  case  of  uniform  taxation  of private  capital. As was
seen  in the  first  section,  the  distortionary  effect  of low  tax  rates  is
limited,  since  diminishing  returns  have  not  come  into  play  very  strongly  at
low  rates  of distortion.
Tax  reform  makes  much  more  of a difference  if  policies  were  not
optimal  to  begin  with.  Figure  8  compares  the  relationship  between  tax  revenue
(as  a ratio  to output)  and  growth  under  uniform  and  differential  taxation. It
is evident  that  tax  reform  makes  little  difference  if  the  initial  level  of
revenue  (and  thus  tax  rate)  is  low. Roughly  similar  rates  of growth  are
associated  with low  levels  of tax  revenue  under  the  differential  tax  as under
the  uniform  tax. Thus,  a *revenue-neutral"  tax  reform  at low  levels  of
revenue  would  not increase  growth  very  much.37
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The  picture  changes,  however,  as further  increases  in  tax  rates  and
revenue  are  initiattv  under  the  two  regimes. At the  point  of  maximum  revenue
under  the  differential  tax  regime,  growth  is  1.3  percentage  points  lower  than
it is  at  comparable  revenue  levels  under  the  uniform  tax  regime. After  that,
further  increases  in  tax  rates  on one  form  of capital  would  cause  both reve.1ue
and  growth  to fall. In such  a situation,  a "revenue-neutral"  tax  reform  that
involved  both  a reduction  of the  rate  and  an extension  of the  base  would  have
two  major  benefits.  It  would  move  the  economy  back  to  the "right'  side  of the
Laffer  curve  (a  movement  along  the  curve  in figure  8(b)),  and  it  would  make
possible  a  higher  growth  rate  through  less  distortion  of allocation  of  private
capital  (a  movement  from  the  curve  in  8(b)  to  the  curve  in  8(a)). As can  be
seen  from  the  graph,  the  first  effect  is likely  to  be  sore  larger  than  the
second. The  value  of a  uniform  tax  rate  regime  is  that  it  not only  makes
possible  the  attainment  of a  higher  maximum  growth  rate,  it  also  limits  the
damage  from  moving  to  the "wrong'  side  of the  Laffer  curve.
4.  The  effect  of government  saving
Beside  the  tax  rate,  the  critical  fiscal  policy  variable  in this
model  is  the  saving  rate  sG.  This  does  not  necessarily  correspond  to the
traditional  measure  of  government  saving,  i.e.  current  revenue  less  current
expenditure.  Rather  it signifies  the  share  of  government  tax  revenue  that  is
devoted  to  productive  expenditure.  This  could  include  such  staples  of  current
expenditure  as  primary  schoolteachers'  salaries. Conversely,  it  would  not
include  nonproductive  items  that  might  be included  as  part  of traditional
measures  of government  Investment.
Figure  9 shows  the  implications  of different  government  saving  rates
for  the  growth-tax  rate  relationship.  In  general,  the  higher  the  government
saving  rate,  the  higher  the  growth  rate  at  each  level  of distortion,  since  aFigure  9
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higher  rate  of government  saving  for  a given  tax  rate  and  private  saving  rate
raises  total  saving  and  total  capital  accumulation.  It is  also  apparent  from
the  graph  that  the  growth  rate  will  reach  a  maximum  at a higher  tax  rate  the
higher  is  the  government  saving  rate.  Higher  government  saving  means  that  tax
rate  increases  pay  off  more in  higher  public  investment,  which  will  offset
more the  distortionary  effects  of the  tax  rate  increases.
More unusual  is the  result  shown  in  the  graph  for  the  extreme  case  in
which  the  government  has  zero  saving. Here  tax  rate  increases  always
initially  lead  to a  decrease  in  growth,  since  there  is  no offsetting  benefit
from  productive  government  expenditure.  Eventually,  however,  the  growth  rate
hits  bottom  and  then  rises  again  with further  tax  increases.  How  can  tax
increases  be good  for  growth  if  there  is  no  productive  government  spending?
The  answer  is that  we are  on the  Rwrongw  side  of the  Laffer  curve  where  tax
rate  increases  decrease  revenue,  which  in  this  case  is  a blessing  in  disguise.
Since  tax  revenue  is  redistributing  income  from  the  high saving  private  sector
to the  zero  saving  government,  a  decrease  in  tax  revenue  has  a positive  effect
on saving. This  more than  offsets  the  distortionary  effect  of tax  rate
increases  in this  case.
The  implications  of this  peculiar  case  for  the  tax  revenue-growth
relationship  are  displayed  in figure  10.  Tax  revenue  is  negatively  related  to
growth,  but  with two  possible  slopes  depending  on  which  side  of the  Laffer
curve  we are  on.  Also  it is  apparent  that  maximum  tax  revenue  is  higher  as a
share  of  output  than  in  the  case  of the  high-saving  government  in  figure  6.
This is  because  tax  revenue  is a function  of the  share  of type  1  private
capital  to  output. Both  the  ratio  of total  capital  to  output  and  the  ratio  of
private  capital  to  total  capital  will  be higher  with a zero  saving  government.Figure  10
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rV.  Conclusions
The  model  in  this  paper  has  concentrated  only  on steady  states  and
thus  ignores  much of  the  complexity  of policy-making  in  which  transitions  play
a large  role.  Although  a  model  of  transitions  between  steady-states  would
sacrifice  the  long-run  simplicity  of  this  model  and  give  many  ambiguous
results,  it is  a fruitful  area  for  further  investigation.  However,  this  paper
has shown  how  a steady-state  model  can  yield  many  insights.
The  structural  model  of distortions  and  growth  in  this  paper  suggests
that  the  relationship  is  more  complicated  than  is  acknowledged  in  most  of the
empirical  work  on growth. In  particular,  simplistic  assumptions  about  linear
inverse  relationships  between  distortion  and  growth  or  between  size  of
government  and  growth  appear  untenable.  However,  some  of  the  complexities  of
the  growth-distortion  relationship  can  be captured  by a simple  increasing
returns  model  that  could  in  principle  be estimated  for  a  particular  country.
Such  a  model  could  enrich  the  dialogue  between  advocates  of
liberalization  and  policymakers  by recognizing  that  decreasing  distortions
does  not  have  an  equal  effect  on  growth  in  all  circumstances.  The  effect
depends  on  how flexible  the  economy  is (the  elasticity  of substitution),  how
large  is  the  share  of the  factor  being  penalized  in  production,  and  how  high
distortions  are  initially.  The  policymaker  should  attempt  to identify  and  to
move along  the  steeply-sloped  portion  of  the  growth-distortion  relationship
where  the  payoff  from  reducfing  distortions  is  high.  Small  changes  to  either
very low  levels  or  very  high levels  of initial  distortions  have  a  minimal
effect  on growth. It  would  be unfortunate  if  policymakers  expended  political
capital  on such  changes  when the  long  run  effects  on growth  are  likely  to  be
disappointing.43
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